Status and acceptance
Implementation, development checks, observed execution and publication/deployment are separate states. Functional evidence connects inputs, the executed path, persisted results, environment and version. The new executions below remain research evidence, not independent-operator operation or production promotion.
Published source and execution records checked 2026-09-12. Measurements outside the new paths below retain the historical environments and versions named in their records.
Update: 2026-09-12
| Path | Observed result | Remaining boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Native confidential-asset notes | Five validators on one host executed issuance, partial fills, refunds, redemption, reuse and decrypted wallet balances after restart. smoke_only. | Synthetic assets; proof inputs and committee keys in one process. Actual venue and DeKYX approval-service integration remain separate. |
| Fresh-network PQC research | Bounded four-account fill/no-fill proofs, canonical state application and recovery. The sealed-input experiment has 740 Block/State transitions. smoke_only. | Operational PQC note relations, the complete venue path, independent custody and exact-construction security remain incomplete. |
| Published material | Latest DeFMI, zkfmi-crypto, OCLOB and QOMM changes published on main; Japanese QOMM decks updated. | Source publication is not production deployment or security certification. |
Confidential-asset evidence · PQC research evidence
One-paragraph summary
The end-to-end path exists and has been run: a participant splits an order or request, seven MPC processes compute it, a 3-of-7 quorum issues a threshold zkPI, and five AvalancheGo validators running the Rust VM settle both legs atomically, agree on a state root, refuse a replay, and recover one validator after a restart with the same root. That is evidence for native execution and recovery. It is not evidence for independent organisations, a WAN, HSM-held keys, a supervisor's key ceremony, or a legal finality regime, and none of those has been attempted.
By component
| component | state | gate that covers it | what remains |
|---|---|---|---|
| zkPI v2 wire, vectors, verifier | built · vectors fixed | zkpi-verify --check-vectors; decode/re-encode byte identity | independent second implementation against the vectors |
| DeFMI ledger: accounts, notes, tags, netting, PvP, reconciliation, viewing, vetting | built · measured | cargo test --locked --workspace; every table regenerated from JSON | atomic admit-pledge-limit-pay; connect existing venue callers to the new confidential wrapper; independent operational acceptance |
| Bulletproof backend | built · measured on host-a | rust_bench.json | rerun both backends on one host before promotion |
| Avalanche L1, Rust VM, 5 validators | accepted · 1 host | run_avalanche_l1_acceptance; QOMM full path at heights 53–54 | independent hosts and operators, WAN, reorg tests, HSM keys, public-network readiness |
| QOMM RFQ, 7-party MP-SPDZ, quote proof, audit slots | built · measured | research_run, placement/sites proxies | seven-site deployment; input-check and shamir-inputs switches default off in the harness; persistent rate-limiter counters |
| DP publication inside MPC | built · 14 processes on 1 host | distributed_publication.json | exact unbounded sampler before a pure-DP claim |
| robust reconstruction (n ≥ 4t+1) | built · measured at n=9 | robust_atlas.json on two machines | not the deployed n=7 engine; input phase not robust; two more institutions |
| OCLOB distributed path to L1 | accepted · 1 host, 7 containers | make remote-integrated-e2e | threshold settlement gateway (one research gateway currently opens the order), independent operators, production API, formal proof |
| DeKYX | built | test, clippy, fmt, release build | issuer governance, revocation ops, issuer-unlinkable credentials (BBS+/CL adapter) |
| DeCCP | built | test, clippy, fmt, release build | cross-margining, partial guarantee transitions, legal novation |
| Aethel | built · 12 crates | test, clippy, fmt, release build | legal assignment, perfection, tax, bankruptcy treatment outside code |
| Hybrid authorization/transport and PQC proof research | implemented · research execution | Historical hybrid execution on 2026-09-06 and 2026-09-07, plus the versioned fresh-network and sealed-input evidence above | Operational PQC notes, complete venue integration, external security validation and independent operators. Details |
| Enterprise PoC guides (JA) | written | — | a company-run evaluation on its own hardware |
| Formal security definition and proofs | not accepted | soundness of input check, naming, hiding proved; MPC assumed; composition argued | UC treatment; OCLOB security definition |
| Third-party audit | none | two internal review rounds, findings recorded | independent cryptographic, Rust, host-VM and integration audit |
What the gates run
Library gate: cargo test -j 4 --locked --workspace in each repository. State-machine checks; no consensus, no multiple validators, no process isolation.
Avalanche L1 gate (defmi): five AvalancheGo processes launching the Rust VM over RPCChainVM 45; account-free notes, pre-authorised reserves, seven-party MPC zkPI, atomic multi-RFQ settlement, shared legal-entity caps, restart recovery, state-root agreement. External binaries (AvalancheGo, avalanche-network-runner, MP-SPDZ) are supplied explicitly with approved SHA-256; the scripts never fetch them.
OCLOB release gate: Rust fmt, clippy, all crate tests, React Flow typecheck and build, real MP-SPDZ, zkPI, DeFMI DvP, canonical readback, replay rejection, in one run on a remote Linux container. The development Mac never builds or tests.
What blocks production
main in every repository. Proofs issued before the change do not verify. The finding note with the tests is in the settlement repository; see Cryptography in use.- A settlement authority that no single party can open. OCLOB's research gateway decrypts the participant's fixed-length settlement authority alone; production needs threshold decryption or joint zkPI generation by the MPC nodes.
- Independence that is real and not only cryptographic. k-of-n is a property of the arithmetic; seven operators, seven hosts, seven key stores, seven failure domains are a property of the world, and none has been set up.
- Persistent state generations across restart for queues, rate limiters and nullifier ledgers, in authenticated storage, so a rollback cannot re-enable a replay.
- Authentication, authorisation and key management: mTLS, per-tenant authorisation, external KMS/HSM, key rotation, backup and recovery.
- The share-to-proof handoff: validators do not re-run the private computation. Closing that needs a proof of the whole MPC and a consensus benchmark that does not exist.
- Legal finality and register connection: a book-entry register, a CSD, a central bank cash leg, a supervisor's disclosure workflow.
Two review rounds, on the record
The repositories keep a review document with every finding, including what was checked and found sound and what was not accepted. Examples of what review changed: two binding switches that were off by default and absent from the deployment guide; a probe budget quoted three times and measured nowhere; a state root that grew with history; an unlinkability property that lived in a naming convention; an input check whose coefficients a node could read before committing; a vetting roll a caller could push its own envelope into; an unexplained single failure that is still listed as unexplained. Reading those before reading the mechanisms is a reasonable order.